Dignity without Borders

WORLD CITIZEN 2020 SIGNATURE CAMPAIGN
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Preface
he world today is similar, yet different to the world of yesteryears, with the international community facing challenges both well-known and absolutely new. Though much effort has been put into resolving the challenges of the past with notable success, completely novel challenges associated with, among other things, advances in warfare technology, have led to shifts in the manner in which wars are waged. These advances have often led to systematic violations of international humanitarian law as the true victims of war - innocent civilians - are killed, injured, displaced in their own countries or become refugees as they flee to safety in others.

This report focuses on refugees fleeing war and destruction, often leaving with nothing but the clothes on their backs. Refugees flee their home countries not only due to international conflict, but also due to violence in their own countries that is unrelated to international conflict. The past four decades have borne witness to the trauma experienced by the people of Afghanistan, while the last decade has evidenced the same for Syrians and the Rohingya people of Myanmar. In the past year, Kashmiri Muslims have lost their home even as they are technically at home.

As the scars of the past seemingly fade, visuals of newborn babies and children separated from their parents and kept in cages at the US-Mexico border keep the nightmares alive. The world as we know it has struggled to keep up with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was drawn up in 1945 as a lesson to remember the loss of human dignity experienced during the Second World War.

Refugees are the bravest of us all. To flee death and destruction in order to survive and save those we love betrays a profound hope for life as well as faith in all things wholesome and true. As they wage their own personal wars to regain lost access to rights, freedoms and dignity in lands unknown to them, in a country that may or may not want their presence, refugees are fighters, but most all, they are believers.

As Turkey gains its rightful place as a force for good in a troubled world and has become renowned in the region, and beyond, as a nation pursuing a principled and humanitarian-driven foreign policy, TRT as a leading news organisation, is also doing its part to make a difference in the world we live in. The campaign titled ‘Dignity without Borders’, organised by TRT World Citizen, is an opportunity for TRT World to reinforce their support for shared prosperity, access and a chance at life for all. While last year’s campaign ‘Women of War’ not only focused on the plight of women and girls as they faced unique challenges associated with war, but also the instrumental role they play as peacebuilders and problem solvers in a world filled with violence and conflict, this year’s campaign will accordingly highlight the unique challenges faced by refugees when it comes to both access and accountability of the international organisations tasked to provide it.

Among the priorities of this campaign is to look at the state of access to justice, education, healthcare and economic opportunity for refugees in multiple host countries around the world. There were more than 70 million refugees in the world by the end of 2018, with 30 million of these under the age of 18 with their whole lives ahead of them. By focusing on access, this report hopes to shed light on not only the conditions that prevent refugees from accessing a better future but also ways forward to ensure a better future becomes reality. Therefore, the campaign will not only support the right for refugees to access all that will enable them to build a better future, but will also aim to work with different civil society organisations who are seeking to rebuild their confidence, ensure their well-being, and encourage their reintegration into society.

By working together to raise awareness of the unique challenges and hostilities faced by refugees in a world that is increasingly becoming unwelcoming, this campaign hopes to create awareness of how international organisations support refugees as well as their host communities. ‘Resilience’ is a key term for many international organisations who work hard to ensure their work sustainably helps both refugees and members of the host communities. This campaign hopes to highlight that and also the importance of equitable availability of resilience-building measures for all.

Refugees, as noted above, are fighters. They are resilience personified. To support them in their resilience, is the true objective of this campaign. The power that comes from such resilience is captured in the words of the great Nelson Mandela himself:

“Do not judge me by my success, judge me by how many times I fell down and got back up again”
Introduction and Key Definitions

The aim of this chapter is fourfold: to outline the common definition of who exactly is a refugee, to highlight the scale of the world’s refugee problem, to ascertain applicable international law and the work of the UNHCR with regards to the world’s refugees, and finally, to demonstrate through a series of short case studies the various challenges and opportunities that refugees face around the world in their quest to access justice. A refugee is commonly defined as a person who has fled armed conflict or persecution and is recognised as needing international protection. Figures from 2018 suggest that 25.9 million refugees are estimated to exist worldwide (including 5.5 million Palestine refugees), with 20.4 million refugees in total under the UNHCR’s mandate (UNHCR 2019a). According to the UNHCR, 3.5 million asylum-seekers were awaiting decisions on their asylum applications in 2018. The United States of America was the world’s largest recipient of individual asylum claims, followed by Peru, Germany, France, and Turkey. Turkey remains the world’s top refugee-hosting country with over 3.7 million (Amnesty International n.d.). Refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar, and Somalia are said to constitute more than 2/3’s of all refugees worldwide.

Though the terms are frequently used interchangeably in media and public discourse, there are consequential differences between people who are deemed to be refugees and those who are ascertained to be migrants. The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, as well as other legal texts such as the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), combine to constitute the cornerstone of modern refugee protection law. In addition to these legal instruments, Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights defines equal access to legal due process as a fundamental human right. Migrants, on the other hand, are those defined as having chosen to move not because of a direct threat of persecution or death, but to improve their lives and, if unsuccessful, can continue to receive the protection of their governments at home. The distinction between a migrant and a refugee matters, but oftentimes it is hard to distinguish between the two. Moreover, migrants and refugees often move as part of the same flows and face some of the same deadly challenges to reach presumed safer havens. Since 2014, the perilous journey across the Mediterranean Sea into Europe has claimed over 19,000 dead or missing (Missing Migrants n.d.).

Amidst these fundamental principles and global trends, what does access to justice mean for those who successfully flee conflict and persecution at home?
WORLD CITIZEN DIGNITY WITHOUT BORDERS

States and Refugee Access to Justice

‘Access to justice’ is a broad term that can encompass several different elements such as the provision of legal assistance, access to tribunal hearings and judicial reviews, procedural protections, and so on. As non-citizens and non-residents, asylum seekers tend to face significant obstacles in terms of access to justice (O’Sullivan & Stevens 2016). Across different countries, refugees may encounter developed asylum laws and procedures but encounter significant barriers to entry in order to benefit from enhanced opportunities. Compounding this tendency is the fact that developing countries as well as those that border states from which refugees flee from usually bear an unfair share of hosting refugees. Countries in ‘developed regions’ hosted 16% of refugees, whilst around a 1/3 of the global refugee population were in the least Developed Countries’ (UNHCR 2018). Ultimately, states bear the primary responsibility for the protection of refugees, and this expressly includes access to asylum procedures that are fair and efficient.

Beyond any reliance on the goodwill of states and the welcome of native populations, UNHCR assists states to absorb refugee flows while abiding by applicable instruments of international law and providing representation to refugees in their often-tumultuous journeys towards resettlement and reintegration. One of the most fundamental principles in international law is that asylum for refugees comprises full protection according to the obligations set out in the 1951 Convention, is that refugees are not to be expelled or returned to situations where their life and freedom would be under threat (the principle of non-refoulement). But questions have been raised as to whether or not the bare minimum of non-return has become the over-arching cornerstone of refugee protection, whilst efforts to afford equal access to legal recourse and justice as well as integration into the host state, the right to work, and social security, become further out of reach (O’Sullivan & Stevens 2016).

As such, even if refugees manage to surpass the various and oftentimes deadly barriers they face to access another state’s territory, this is no guarantee of access to justice. For many, the ordeal now takes a different form. Refugees can face considerable challenges concerning access to justice: being barred from national courts, being unable to afford court fees, being unable to access information regarding legal procedures, and often facing seemingly endless wait time. The UNHCR has estimated that 87% of the refugees it assists are encamped, and long-term encampment of refugees has become the dominant methods for states to resort to in order to deal with large refugee flows. Closed borders, xenophobic backlashes from native populations, rejected asylum applications, poverty, enhanced risk of sexual violence, suicides, and lengthy waits are some of the many challenges’ refugees face besides access to justice. Briefly, to give but two brief concrete examples, there are now approximately 15,000 people living in refugee camps across various Greek islands who often have no choice but to endure the well-documented dire sanitary and living conditions there. In Libya, conditions for migrants and refugees have become so terrible that a modern-day slave trade is now said to have emerged where, as per the Washington Post (2017), smuggled or swindled by human traffickers, “some of the world’s most desperate people are being held as slaves, tortured or forced into prostitution”.

An irregular migrant is seen with her baby at the Moria Refugee Camp in Lesbos, Greece on November 26, 2019. Irregular migrants struggle to survive in inhuman conditions of the Moria camp. Thousands of irregular migrants, mainly women and children, are forced to sleep in summer tents outside the camp despite rain and cold weather due to overcrowding of the camp. (Ayhan Mehmet - Anadolu Agency)
Beyond a recently reported 96,500 refugees and migrants (UNHCR 2019b), Greece, has faced a plethora of economic challenges, and the enforcement of the above-mentioned policy remains a compelling story of how refugees who successfully claim asylum may then find it hard to integrate into Greek society and may be left in more precarious situation after having claimed asylum. Previously, a landmark ‘refugee deal’ was reached between Turkey and the European Union in order to help stem the flow of refugees into Europe. Worriedly, Greece’s new government has been more vociferously opposed to the presence of refugees. Daily Sabah (2020) has reported that an estimated 30 refugees a day are deported by Greece to Turkey facilitated by a controversial new law passed on October 31st, 2019 (The Guardian, 2019). The law aims to fast-track asylum decisions and quickly send back denied applicants. A new timeframe has been enforced that gives rejected applicants only 10 days to lodge an appeal. Amidst reported irregularities, applicants face both language barriers and the challenge of finding legal aid in a now vastly compressed time period (Psaropoulos 2020). Greece currently faces a reported backlog of around 68,000 asylum applications, but in terms of access to justice, the bill forbids the possibility of appeal in the event of a rejected asylum application. The bill denies access to free legal counselling and can reduce presiding judges that grant claims to one from two. Asylum interviews are to be conducted by the police and army, rather than the Greek Asylum Service as was previously the case. Greece has also been reported to have forcibly pushed would-be asylum seekers back into Turkey without registration. The new law has been enacted as of January 1st and has quickly been criticised by human rights groups, aid organisations, and opposition parties (Smith 2019).

Libya—beyond the chaos that has ensued post-Gaddafi as well as the most recent hostilities—has been the scene of abhorrent crimes against refugees and migrants who have been caught both in the crossfires of the conflict and have also been subject to what has been called a modern-day slave trade (Washington Post 2017). 90% of people that cross the Mediterranean Sea to Europe depart from Libya (UNHCR 2017), but thousands of others never even make it for perilous journey across the Mediterranean. Refugees found at sea vying to reach the chance of a better life in Europe have been returned to Libya instead, whilst human traffickers operate throughout the war-torn country. Amid safety concerns and on-going ceasefire violations by Haftar, the UNHCR suspended work at a refugee gathering and departure facility (UNHCR 2020).

The purpose of this section is to focus on a set of concrete examples of the challenges’ refugees face in their plight, primarily as it concerns access to justice. It is important to bear in mind that the struggle for access to justice is both proceeded by, and can be followed-up by, a further array of difficulties for refugees and former refugees around the world. Briefly on the latter, to win a claim for asylum is still by no means the golden ticket to a better life. In a particularly paradoxical twist of events, reports from Greece suggest that the government has begun to enforce a policy whereby refugees who win their case for asylum see the support they had before they won their cases (such as cash cards and accommodation), rescinded after six months (PRI 2019). At the time of writing, beyond the cases outlined below, the world is also bearing witness to the struggles of refugees from Venezuela, Sudan, Syria, and the troubles of those in offshore centres of Australia. In July 2019, in what had been described as a possible war crime, 44 people were killed and 130 wounded as Khalifa Haftar’s forces bombed a migrant detention centre in Tripoli, Libya (UN 2019).

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Case Studies

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It has been estimated that since 2017, more than 700,000 Rohingya Muslims have arrived in Bangladesh as they have fled violence and persecution in Myanmar (Horsey 2019). Recently, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) conveyed last month to hear an opening request for charges of genocide to be brought against Myanmar for atrocities committed against the Rohingya. Previously, the United Nations Human Rights Council found sufficient evidence to warrant the investigation and prosecution of senior Myanmar military officials for widespread and systematic crimes against the Rohingya (UNHRC 2018). Myanmar itself has an extensively negative track record with the Rohingya: they are denied recognition as one of the country’s 135 official ethnic groups, they are denied citizenship, and are in effect stateless in a state that institutionally discriminates against them (CFR 2020). Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s current State Counsellor (a position akin to a Prime Minister), failed to even mention the word ‘Rohingya’ in her defence speech at the ICJ. As they continue to flee persecution in Myanmar, there are now an estimated 1.2 million Rohingya people in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, where, as Human Rights Watch has described, the Rohingya live in “the largest refugee settlement in the world” (Robertson 2019). Like elsewhere, access to justice be it in community dispute resolution forums or state legal systems, is far from perfect (IRC 2019). Bangladesh, of course, faces a variety of challenges itself and had recently attempted to repatriate Rohingya back to Myanmar. This ended in failure as no Rohingya elected to return and accept the Myanmar government’s offer of a National Verification Card (NVC) which identifies them as foreigners in without the promise of eventual citizenship (ibid.). There remains a possibility, however slight, that justice will begin to be served at the ICJ and the conditions for safe and sustainable repatriation can begin to be sown.

The United States had previously led the world for decades in terms of refugee admission and resettlement. Since 1975, an estimated 3 million refugees have resettled in the US (UNHCR USA n.d.). Nevertheless, as per the Pew Research Centre, the US has witnessed a decline in refugee admissions at a time when the number of refugees worldwide has reached its highest levels since World War II (Krogstad 2019). Any reference to the US as a case study is indelibly part of a broader discussion of just how far the most developed and affluent countries of the world should assume or share in the many socio-economic pressures that influences of refugees may exert upon any given society. The Donald Trump administration has stipulated lower quotas for refugee acceptance, though according to the Council of Foreign Relations, both the Bush and Obama administrations regularly admitted fewer refugees than quotas allowed (Felter and McBride 2018). There have also been concerns that the admittance of more Christian rather than Muslim refugees may be more than simple coincidence, especially in light of the highly publicised Trump ‘Muslim ban’ (see Niayesh 2019).

The first-ever UNHCR Global Refugee Forum (co-convened by Turkey, amongst others), took place in Geneva, Switzerland from 16-18 December 2019 (UNHCR 2019c). The Forum brought together various heads of state, refugees, UN leaders, international organisations, business leaders, and civil society organisations. Attended by some 3,000 participants, over 770 commitments were made, including that of private sector entities who pledged that they would work to provide job opportunities for refugees. This development came a year after the Global Compact on Refugees announced in 2018, which provided a blueprint for governments, international organisations, and other relevant stakeholders, so that a more equitable responsibility-sharing framework could be reached for refugee protection worldwide (UNHCR n.d.). The Forum raised some $3 billion in funds from multilateral development agencies and a reported $250 million from private sources (Karasapan 2020). More recently, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, the UNHCR upheld the non-refoulement rights of refugees who flee from the dangers of climate change. That climate change refugees may also be witnessed in large numbers is in and of itself a worrisome and sombre reckoning of just how damaging global climate change might be (Al Jazeera 2020). The Global Refugee Forum also served to sustain awareness over the plight of the world’s refugees, the public’s attention for which can ebb and flow. All efforts to protect refugees and facilitate their access to justice are commendable. However, the underlying causes of the refugee problem, be it the impact of climate change, civil war, or religious and other forms of persecution, must be addressed at its core.
Defining Education under Attack

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ducation has been under attack in multiple countries affecting both refugees and non-refugees, but it has been difficult to define or assess its full impact on students, teachers, education personnel, education institutions as well as local and national governments. This is because of the intersectional nature of education provision and consumption. Children being out of school can be attributed to multiple reasons at any given time, including both supply and demand side factors such as availability of schools and teachers (that may or may not have been available before any societal violence) or demand for education itself.

However, according to the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), ‘the years from 2014 to 2016 were three of the five most violent and deadly since 1989’ (Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, 2018, p. 26). Education has come increasingly under attack in recent years, with the proliferation of armed extremist groups such as Daesh and its affiliates in countries including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Syria, Turkey and Yemen. Attacks on education also worsened as political or economic crises grew in India, Burundi, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Dominican Republic of Congo (DRC) (Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, 2018).

Access to primary and secondary education for refugees is determined by many factors associated with the mechanisms of attacks on education as described above. The security situation (such as the physical destruction of educational infrastructure and the pervasive nature of violence and insecurity for children both inside and outside of schools) can be a factor associated with lack of access to education both in their country or origin as well as host country (UNHCR, UNICEF & IOM, 2019).

To understand the many ways education security can deteriorate in terms of both consumption and provision, six mechanisms were outlined by the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA) in their Education under Attack 2018 report. These included attacks on schools, attacks on students, teachers and school personnel, military use of schools, attacks on higher education as well as sexual violence and child recruitment at or on the way to or from schools.
Spotlight: Central and West Africa

According to a comprehensive United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) report on attacks on education in Central and West Africa, growing violence and conflict has led to devastating effects on education. By mid-2019, more than 9000 schools had been closed in the region, affecting almost 2 million children and 45,000 teachers (UNICEF, 2019) – a rate that has tripled within two years. More than 40 million students are out of school in the region.

Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, countries belonging to the central Sahel region, witnessed a six-fold increase in school closures due to violence, from 512 to 3,005. More than 2000 schools closed in Burkina Faso alone. 25 percent of children globally that require ‘humanitarian support – including education and other services critical to learning – live in just 10 countries in West and Central Africa’ (UNICEF, 2019, p.3).

Source: UNICEF, 2019

Spotlight: Afghanistan

After a three year decline in the numbers of attacks on schools, Afghanistan witnessed a tripling of attacks on education facilities in the year between 2017 and 2018. Quoting UNICEF, BBC News (2019) reported that almost 200 schools were attacked during this period. One of the reasons for the increased violence was that many schools had become polling centres for the Afghan Parliamentary Elections scheduled for September 2018, making them targets for anti-government forces (BBC News, 2019).

Consequently, by the end of 2018, more than 1000 schools had closed. Conflict, high rates of poverty, fear of sexual violence and discrimination against girls’ education, deny Afghan children their right to a safe education; almost 50 percent – that is 1 out of every two school-going age children – do not go to school in Afghanistan (BBC News, 2019). The previously falling rate of out-of-school children increased in 2019, the first year since 2002 (BBC News, 2019).
Spotlight: Syria

Lebanon continues to host more than 1.5 million Syrian refugees more than nine years after the start of the Syrian war (Children on the Edge, n.d.), out of which more than 630,000 are children of school-going age. However, less than 50 percent have access to safe and quality formal education, with almost 180,000 Syrian children having to work in be able to support their families suffering from intense poverty (Children on the Edge, n.d.).

Those that do have access to formal education and often face ‘discrimination, abuse, language barriers and unsafe journeys to and from school’ (Children on the Edge, n.d.). As per a report by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), refugee children may have previously experienced ‘imprisonment, torture, loss of property, malnutrition, physical assault, extreme fear, rape, loss of livelihood and separation from family members’ (2019, p. 11). Psychological trauma is often a very disruptive barrier to education for Syrian refugee children in Lebanon and elsewhere, with many schools with refugee children lacking adequate mental health facilities to help them (UNESCO, 2019).
Challenges Associated with Refugee Education in Host Countries

By the end of 2017, there were more than 25.4 million refugees worldwide. More than half of the global refugee population – 52 per cent – were under the age of 18. There were 4 million out of school refugee children.

Access to primary and secondary education for refugees is determined by many factors associated with the mechanisms of attacks on education as described above. While deteriorating security is linked with a lack of access to education in refugees’ home countries, other factors lead to a lack of access to education in the host country as well.

These factors include exclusion along individual characteristics such as gender and ethnicity, discrimination in policies and practice such as non-recognition of previous studies, refugee governance such as whether the right to education is protected by law, supply factors such as insufficient funds and human resources for refugees’ education resulting in limited available places in schools and demand factors such as stereotyping, bullying and facing judgment as a refugee child in schools in host countries (UNHCR, UNICEF & IOM, 2019). These define some of the unique challenges associated with refugee education both in and outside camp settings in host countries as defined by UNHCR (2011):

**Urban refugee education strategies are different from camp setting strategies**

Most of challenges associated with refugee education are applicable to both camp and non-camp settings in host countries. In camp-based education settings, it is important to align the curriculum with that of the refugees’ country of origin. However, in non-camp urban settings, refugee education curriculum must be as closely aligned to the national and local curriculum of the host country as possible (INNEE, 2004, p. 57; UNHCR, 2003b, p. 11 in UNHCR, 2011). Additionally, if legal and policy barriers do not allow for formal refugee education in urban areas, then informal schools become the only option (UNHCR, 2011). A case in point is Malaysia:

“The 13,865 refugee children and young people (ages 5–17) living in Malaysia are unable to access public or private schools. Only 5,134, or about 37%, were attending any form of school at the end of 2010 (Kaun, 2011; Rahman, 2011, p. 36); as a point of comparison, national GER in Malaysia in 2007 was 97% (UNESCO, 2011, p. 305). While most of these schools use the Malaysian national syllabus, there is no formal certification of learning and no recognition of studies by any authority (Nirrengarten, 2010; Rahman, 2011)” (UNHCR, 2011, p.45).

In Turkey, national legislation supports the right to education for all, including children from families seeking international protection. Public schools in Turkey are free of charge and all refugee children have the right to attend these schools (UNHCR, 2011).

**Limited access to post-primary education for refugees in both camp and urban settings has economic and social consequences for individuals and societies**

Acceptable options for post-primary education are limited in refugee settings, and at times difficult to reach (UNHCR, 2011). This leads to a shortage of supply of education provision in both host country and even when refugees return to their countries of origin.

This was evident when refugees returned to villages in Mauritania where they found both number of secondary schools and quality of education to be inferior to their host country Senegal. Thus, many parents returned to Mauritania while their children remained in Senegal to continue their studies (Rezzonico, 2011 in UNHCR, 2011).

**Differences between primary and secondary school enrolment for refugee children**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary school enrolment</th>
<th>Secondary school enrolment</th>
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<td>92%</td>
<td>84%</td>
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Source: UNHCR, 2017
• Inherently political nature of the content and structures of refugee education

The political nature of the content and structures of refugee education can ‘exacerbate societal conflict, alienate individual children, and lead to education that is neither of high quality nor protective’ (UNHCR, 2011, p. 63). Language of instruction in particular becomes politically contentious (UNHCR, 2011).

Additionally, education (or lack thereof) may be used to influence human mobility in the context of refugees, especially repatriation. Premature closure of schools have wider consequences though. For example, when schools were prematurely shut for Burundians in Tanzania, gender based violence increased significantly in the camps.

Consequences for the Individual and the Community

If access to education is not adequately provided, there can be devastating short and long-term consequences for the individual, their family, and the community they become a part of or return to, particularly impacting minority groups including females and those with learning disabilities. For women, lower levels of education are linked with early marriage, higher rates of maternal and infant mortality, inability to participate in or influence politics, police, or peace and transitional justice processes (Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, 2018; UNHCR, 2011).

Refugee families facing financial constraints tend to prioritize the education of boys over that of girls. These families typically are more reluctant to continue to send girls to school, with one of the reasons being fear of sexual harassment and violence. This is particularly true in conflict-affected contexts. Save the Children found that Syrian refugee families made their daughters drop out of school early to get them married in a bid to protect them from sexual violence (UNHCR, 2011). The lack of options for post-primary refugee education in particular has additional consequences. Having the option of secondary education motivates families to enrol their children in primary school in the first place (Robinson, 2011 in UNHCR, 2011). Economic returns for secondary education are high for both individuals and society. For individuals, ‘each additional year of formal education on average adds about 10% to an individual’s earnings, and secondary education adds 20% for low-income individuals’ (Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2002, p. 2 in UNHCR, 2011, p. 49). For communities that these low-income individuals belong to, secondary returns are, for example, 18 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa (Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2002, p. 12 in UNHCR, 2011). Additionally, secondary education affords ‘greater opportunities for civic participation and quality of life’ (IIEP, 2011; INEE Working Group on Education and Fragility, n.d. in UNHCR, 2011, p. 49). Refugees can be deprived of these social, political and economic opportunities when post-primary refugee education options are limited.
Exemplars of Effective Refugee Education Policy and Programmatic Strategies

Alignment of national and local education curricula of the host country with the refugee education curricula in urban education settings (UNHCR, 2011)

- **TURKEY:** Most refugee children in camp settings had full access to basic education mainly at Temporary Education Centre (GEM) administered inside the camps. GEMs are schools established and run for the purpose of providing temporary education services to refugees in Turkey, offering courses in Arabic and intensive Turkish language courses (European Council on Refugees and Exile, n.d.). Refugee children in urban non-camp settings had the option of either attending a public school where they teach the Turkish school curriculum and instruct in Turkish, or a GEM. Public schools in Turkey are free of charge for Syrian refugees, even if they are not registered as refugees and enrol as ‘guest students’ (European Council on Refugees and Exile, n.d.).

Supporting enrolment through coordination of all actors (UNHCR, UNICEF & IOM, 2019)

- **GREECE:** In 2016, the Greek Ministry of Education established ‘afternoon reception classes’ to support refugee children aged 6-15 living in camps transition into second-shift classes in public schools. In 2017, the Ministry tripled ‘morning reception classes’ for refugee children residing in urban areas to integrate them into the public education system within regular school hours and with Greek children. They received additional Greek language support. Parents and children were sensitized and accompanied throughout the registration process and beyond by multiple education and accommodation actors (UNHCR, UNICEF & IOM, 2019).

Access to post-primary education should be available to all refugees.

- **TURKEY:** As tuition fees have been waived for Syrian refugees in Turkey, 33,000+ Syrian refugee students are currently attending university in Turkey free of cost. Additionally, since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) provided 5,341 scholarships to Syrian university students, including a monthly living stipend (Cherri, 2019).

Strengthen teachers’ capacity to integrate refugee and migrant children

- **TURKEY:** The Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into the Turkish Education System (PICTES) programme was launched in 2016 to support the activities of the Ministry of National Education for the integration of refugee children into the public education system. The project funded language and counselling training for approximately 6,000 Turkish teachers to provide counselling to Syrian children in public schools, which delivered positive results (European Council on Refugees and Exile, n.d.).

According to the UNHCR Turkey (n.d.), ‘refugee youth and young adults need to have access to educational programmes that will enable them to enter high skill professions and obtain the skills needed to make a significant contribution to the communities’ that they belong to.

- **FINLAND:** A ‘Skills Centre’ was opened in 2016 in Helsinki that offers vocational education, employment and language training services for refugee and migrant adolescents who are 17+ years old and do not have language skills yet at the level needed for employment or vocational training (UNHCR, UNICEF & IOM, 2019).

Apply lenses of ‘conflict and power to assess the content and structures of education, including curriculum, language, and relationships between actors’ (UNICEF, 2011, p. 82), support peace education and provide education programs even during repatriation efforts, ‘at least until education can be offered in areas of return’ (UNHCR, 2011, p. 82).

- **TURKEY:** Turkey continues to offer free public education and scholarships for admission into Turkish universities (Cherri, 2019) to Syrian refugees even as Syrian refugees begin returning to Syria (Bowman, 2019).
Access to Economic Opportunity

By Mustafa Metin Başbay

Economic Inclusion for Refugees

Refugees can make immense contributions to the local economies where they settle. There is substantial evidence which shows that, given the opportunity, refugees can improve local labour conditions, add to the entrepreneurial capital, improve the demographic structure, and increase productivity of the recipient economies. However, to realise this potential, refugees first need to be integrated into the economy. They need access to the labour market, legal permission to become entrepreneurs, language and occupational training, access to financial services, and some degree of freedom of movement so they can add to the productive capacity. Unfortunately, in most countries, refugees are restricted from joining the economy to some extent, if not entirely, because they are locked up in refugee camps.

The main reason refugees are denied access to economic opportunities are the commonly held beliefs such as that they increase unemployment or strain the public budget. Immigration surely has some disruptive effects, especially when it occurs in high numbers and in a short period of time. However, the positive effects of immigration are often overlooked. Evidence shows that when they are given the opportunity, refugees are net contributors to the economy. In the long term, they usually improve the labour market conditions for locals and pay more in taxes than they receive in benefits. They improve productivity and increase output. How much of this potential can actually be realised depends on the institutional capacity and successful management of the host countries.

Over the last decade, millions of people (UN, 2019) have been displaced for various reasons, including military conflict, natural disaster, and economic distress. One particularly notable case is Syria where more than 5 million people have had to cross the border to escape war. It is an undeniable fact that refugee-hosting countries are bearing significant economic costs and disruption. Needless to say, economic inclusion of refugees requires infrastructure and the proper institutional and legal basis. Some are doing a better job than others in terms of smoothly incorporating refugee communities into the local economy. In cases of successful inclusion, both refugees and the recipient economies mitigate the negative consequences better and even stand to benefit substantially.
The Benefits of Economic Inclusion

One common misconception is that if the refugee communities were to join the local labour force, they would drive out local workers or compress their wages. However, in many cases this has proven false. Refugees may increase competition in some segments of the labour market and lead to wage compression in the short run, however, the overall effects of refugee inflow, especially in the long term, are often positive. Refugees lead to an expansion of the market; they boost consumer spending which helps businesses grow and employment to rise. While they may take some employment opportunities, they also improve the total number of available employment opportunities in the long run. Tümen (2016), for instance, shows that in Turkey, refugee employment increased output in informal sectors and cheapened consumer products.

Furthermore, refugees are usually complementary, not substitute, to the local labour force in terms of skills. In other words, they do not compete for similar jobs but opt for low-skilled jobs with lower wages. This leads to what economists call ‘occupational upgrading’ for local workers. As low-skilled, low-pay jobs are taken by refugee workers, locals’ job opportunities improve, and wages rise (Lewis, 2013; Wolla, 2014). This is an empirically well-documented process in cases such as the US, the UK and Denmark (Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Manacorda et al., 2012; Foged and Peri, 2016). Furthermore, especially in the rapidly ageing societies of Europe, despite administrative obstacles, skilled refugees seem to be filling in important gaps rather than squeezing the labour market (Dowling, 2019). In Turkey too, it has been shown by a number of studies that refugee inflow helped local workers to move up from informal to formal employment (Del Caprio and Wagner, 2016; Kirdar et al., 2018).

Another advantage of economic inclusion is the entrepreneurial capital which refugees add to the local economy. Refugees are often successful entrepreneurs; they have a higher tendency to take risks and have a more flexible mindset. For example, immigrants represent only 15% of the population in the US, but they are 25% of all the entrepreneurs. Similarly, in the UK, an average immigrant is twice as likely to start a new business as a native-born. This means immigrants contribute twice as much to entrepreneurship (Goldin, 2018). Furthermore, studies show that refugee businesses are usually more successful compared to locals in terms of employment growth and survival over a long period of time (Kerr and Kerr, 2016). Alesina et al. (2016) also report that the birthplace diversity of immigrants relates positively to measures of economic prosperity.

Refugees can also improve the demographic structure of the recipient countries. This is important especially for developed economies. Future projections show that in a not so distant future, societal ageing will put enormous strain on fiscal budgets of rich economies such as Germany, the UK, and France (Cecchetti et al., 2010). With increasing life expectancy and decreasing birth rates, more people in these countries depend on a smaller share of the population for financing health spending and retirement pensions. Incorporating more refugees to the labour market can ease the pressure on social security systems and fiscal budgets in these economies. In developing countries too, refugees can expand the so-called ‘demographic window of opportunity’, the period of time when the share of the working-age population is larger than the dependent population. Turkey, for instance, is expected to gain a further decade thanks to the Syrian refugee inflow. Previous calculations estimated that it would end in 2030 (Esen and Binatlı, 2017).

A major concern regarding the inclusion of refugees is that they will put burden on government budgets and strain public services. Studies show that even though this may be true in the short run, the effects of refugee inflow reverse in the medium to long term. Evans and Fitzgerald (2017), for instance, show that refugees who enter the US at ages between 18 and 45 pay $21 thousand more in taxes than they receive in public benefits over a 20 year period. Thus, even though they may receive more initially, in the long run refugees become net contributors to the fiscal budget. Needless to say, one precondition of this is the legal inclusion of refugees in the economy so they can operate in the formal market and pay taxes.

Lastly, Bahar and Rapoport (2018) claim that immigration also leads to productivity improvements via knowledge diffusion. They claim that refugees can transfer substantial know-how and experience to host economies, which will lead to the emergence of new export industries. Specifically, they report that “a 10% increase in immigration from exporters of a given product is associated with a 2% increase in the likelihood that the host country starts exporting that good ‘from scratch’ in the next decade.” Related to this, Goldin et al. (2018) claim that if immigration had been stopped in 1990, in 2014 the real GDP of the UK and Germany would have been approximately $230 billion and $175 billion lower respectively.

Syrian refugee women take part in a project of decorating a home filled with crochet in Avesta, Sweden on August 6, 2016. (Mehral Bakaldin - Anadolu Agency)
Challenges of Economic Inclusion of Refugees

The most critical lever for the economic inclusion of refugees is the right to seek employment. It is often forgotten that if refugees are already present in a country, their exclusion from the labour market, for instance by limiting their movements to refugee camps, does not end the withdrawal of resources by refugees from the economy but only their contributions to it. When they are refused the opportunity to work, refugees, in turn, become reliant on government aid and NGOs. Furthermore, economic vulnerability exacerbates negative consequences such as crime, ghettoization, and communal tensions.

One important challenge for inclusion is that governments usually fail to surmount common misconceptions and reject the populist demands for the exclusion of refugees from the labour market. Unfortunately, this defines the situation in many European countries such as Austria, Greece, France, and Italy. After the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, to deal with the refugee inflow, European countries seem to have chosen policies of isolation rather than focusing on successful inclusion. While Greece found the ‘solution’ in effectively trapping Syrian and Afghan refugees to its islands, France and Austria continue to isolate refugees in camps infamous for their substandard conditions. Other continue to refuse legal access to employment (Karakoulaki, 2019).

One counterexample is Turkey. Currently, Turkey is home to around 4 million refugees, most of whom escaped the war in Syria, making Turkey host to the highest number of refugees in the world (Khoudour & Anderson, 2017). Unlike European countries, Turkey did not try to restrict refugees to camps or prevent from joining the labour force. There are currently 62 thousand refugees who voluntarily stay in camps, which accounts for only about 3% of all refugees. Consequently, out of 2.2 million working-age Syrians, 1 million are employed across the country and have become self-reliant. This is quite high considering that most of the unemployed are either students or housewives (another form of informal employment) (TEPAV, 2018). It is important to note that this relatively high employment rate relieves the government of enormous pressure for monitoring, policing and aiding a huge refugee population.

Another challenge is the inclusion of refugees in the formal market. In most contexts, even though refugees are able to work, they are not given access to registered businesses. In other words, they are limited to the informal economy. In Lebanon, for instance, refugees are restricted to only three sectors; agriculture, construction, and cleaning. Otherwise, they are in situations of informal employment. Even if they are officially permitted to work, refugees still end up in informal employment. This is mostly the case in Turkey. Despite official permission since 2016 and recently announced subsidies, only 32 thousand Syrians (1.5%) in Turkey currently have work permits. This is probably due to the rigidity of labour market caused by high insurance costs and labour taxes. As a result, an overwhelming majority of refugees do not have job security, are paid less than minimum wage and avoid paying taxes. However, evidence also shows that this has contributed to the occupational upgrading of the local workers, who have enjoyed increased opportunities in formal employment (Del Caprio and Wagner, 2016; Kirdar et al., 2018).

Jordan, which hosts an estimated 1.3 million refugees as of 2019, has so far issued 125 thousand work permits, making the country a success story. However, on many other accounts the situation is quite gloomy. In particular, the country’s infrastructure has struggled to carry the weight. In a statement, Jordan’s Planning Ministry said, “Education, health and water infrastructure have been tremendously strained in several communities.” According to the minister, due to the refugee influx, water consumption in Amman, the country’s capital city, has risen by 20% and many schools are now operating in double shifts. Furthermore, the public debt of Jordan has risen consequently due to increased budgetary spending (Federman and Akour, 2019). This is an example of how limited local infrastructure or resources combined with a large refugee inflow can cause problematic results, at least in the short term.
Lebanon, which hosts more than 1.5 million refugees and is the second top destination for Syrian refugees after Turkey, also suffers from deficiencies in infrastructure and public services. On the top of that, there have been claims that the Lebanese government has recently been intentionally making life more difficult for refugees. In 2019, government forced Syrian refugees to demolish their cinder-block homes in a border town and forced them to move into refugee camps. Furthermore, there have been claims that the police have increased pressure on local employers to fire Syrian workers (Vohra, 2019). The country already has a very high unemployment rate, which may have motivated government to follow such strict policies. However, as discussed above, the belief that refugees increase unemployment is mostly unsubstantiated. More importantly, forcing refugees out of the market is likely to make things worse. Vohra (2019) claims that xenophobia and sectarian nationalism has also been influential in this approach in Lebanon.

Another critical issue relating to the economic inclusion of refugees is occupational and language training. In the lack of upward mobility, recipient countries risk creating an underclass of refugee communities. That’s why, alongside education for children, refugees should be offered access to relevant training so that they can better and more quickly integrate into the economy. The OECD (2015), for instance, reports that the provision of language and professional training is crucial for successful integration. Obviously, this is largely dependent on the host countries’ infrastructure and resources. According to Kancs and Lecca (2017), providing language and professional training may indeed be very costly for the public budget in the short run. However, they also report that in 9 to 19 years such programs lead to the full repayment of the initial budgetary spending and also improve economic growth.

A positive example, and unfortunately an exception in Europe, is Germany. While other European countries, including Italy, France, Greece, Austria etc., have been looking for ways to isolate refugees from the local economy, Germany has invested in the refugee population through public-financed language courses and professional training. A study by the government’s migration institution shows that of all the refugees who arrived in Germany during the height of the migrant crisis in 2015-16, 20% had a job by 2017 and 35% by 2018. Furthermore, official data confirms that refugees are filling vacancies in the labour market rather than displacing local workers. For the time being, the government is spending more on refugee than it takes in taxes, however, the German Institute for Economic Research forecasts that refugees will become net contributors to the government budget by 2021, when an employment rate of 55-60% will be achieved (Dowling, 2019). It is fair to say that German case proves many of the points made in the previous chapter in terms of long-term benefits of refugee integration.

**Policy Conclusions**

The number of refugees displaced by civil conflicts, economic distress, or natural disasters is on the rise globally. While forced migration has transformative and usually traumatic effects on refugees’ lives, large refugee inflows also have serious economic consequences for the recipient economies. These countries face more strain on public services and infrastructure, increased burden on government budgets, and a period of disruption in the labour market. All of these effects may stress the local economy for a period of time. However, substantial evidence shows that the economic integration of refugees usually bears fruit in the long term by adding new labour, experience, and talent to the economy. Given the opportunity, refugees are net contributors to the public budget, expand the labour market, and improve productivity. They contribute proportionally more to the entrepreneurial capacity and help local workers upgrade occupationally.

Realisation of this potential is dependent on the successful and smooth incorporation of the refugee community into the economy. Governments should lay the ground for the economic inclusion of refugees by creating the necessary legal and institutional framework. First and foremost, refugees should have access to the labour market. Sometimes governments falsely believe that excluding refugees from the economy can help the country mitigate some of the adverse consequences of migrant inflows. However, the costs of non-integration are considerably higher. Turkey provides a good case study for the benefits of allowing refugees a certain level of freedom of movement and access to the labour market. Mobility allows refugees to better match their skills with job opportunities so they can become self-reliant and relieve pressure on public resources.

Secondly, not only should refugees have access to employment, but they should also be allowed to start businesses. Refugees should be able to become entrepreneurs so they can create jobs, increase output, and improve productivity. Preventing refugees from starting businesses ultimately channels them to underground activities. Last but not least, governments can facilitate the economic inclusion of refugees via training and education programs. The language barrier is often of unavoidable importance for integration while occupational training may be a gateway for unskilled refugees. Depending on the context, even obligatory training may be considered as a policy. In that respect, Germany is a good example. It should be said that the major barrier for inclusion policies is usually ideological predisposition and popular misconception, rather than sound policy. Therefore, policymakers have to bear in mind the importance of public opinion and create channels to better inform their respective societies.
A Framework for Health

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), we are now witnessing unprecedented levels of human displacement with 65.6 million refugees globally. The influx of refugees is due primarily to escalating stressful environments in countries that are already inflicted by poverty and conflict (WHO, 2018). International Refugee Law (IRL) is the set of rules and regulations that guide the management of asylum seekers. In 1951, a consultative forum was held in Geneva that resulted in a legal document ratified by 145 states. The Refugee Convention defined refugee status, rights, freedoms and responsibilities of host states to protect them (UNHCR). In collaboration with international organisations such as the World Health Organisation (WHO), this framework binds host countries to a managerial protocol based on a stipulation of the rights and freedoms of refugees (Lambert, 2017). The essence of this document is the idea of non-refoulement, which denotes that a refugee should not be forced back to a country in which they would be likely to face persecution. This customary international practice is premised upon Article 14 in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).

As it relates to health, displacement presents refugees with three prevailing risks: psychiatric disorders, communicable and non-communicable diseases. Firstly, and most notably, the experience of displacement puts migrants at increased risk of stress and trauma resulting from travel and its associated hardships. Secondly, the conditions refugees often face make them vulnerable to infectious diseases that are endemic to their host countries. Thirdly, the threat of chronic diseases - including the non-communicable ones – is exacerbated from underdiagnoses and aggravated due to poor living conditions in host countries.

Human rights for refugees is an important framework for discussing the vulnerability of displaced populations. This framework raises important legal questions regarding the intersection of universal refugee law and host countries’ policies. To discuss this, this paper will first present the human right to health. Then, it will present the issues that face migrants, notably women and children as well as the issue of mental health. Finally, it will discuss the barriers to a rights-based health care approach.
A Rights-Based Healthcare Approach

A rights-based health care approach would ideally incorporate a holistic protocol for both treatment and prevention. Meeting the right to health for refugees is not only about ensuring proper diagnosis and treatment. It should also entail effective and regular screening as well as public health educational campaigns. An effectively governed health system would give us the multifaceted programming necessary to eventually grant displaced persons agency over their own physical and mental health. Refugees fleeing conflict often arrive at borders with mental and emotional burdens in addition to physical ailments resulting from conflict, natural disasters or malnutrition.

The cause of migrant health deterioration often lies beyond the reason for their migration in the first place. According to the WHO, factors experienced in transit and in destination countries, and not only those in their countries of origin, have a significant impact on the health of refugee populations. These factors include lack of clean water and adequate nutrition, the legal status of the individual and the policies that grant or deny access to services, and their living and working conditions. Health for migrants has social, political, economic and cultural barriers. Moreover, language barriers, social, cultural, economic, and even discriminatory practices all contribute to the process of ‘integration’ or access to health services (WHO, 2018). These factors, beyond governmental programming, combine to form an uneasy environment for migrants to seek health services.

The steps needed towards the development of a universal health system for migrants was framed by the 1986 Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion, considered by the WHO as foundational to the development of policy and practice in promoting health for migrants (WHO, 2018). The charter outlines five priorities: crafting healthy public policy, building supportive environments, investing in community initiatives, developing personal skills and reorienting health services (WHO, 2018). The rights-based framework of refugee law already had a significant impact on the application programme in the member states (McAdam, 2017). Additionally, the WHO continually drafts global action plans to promote the health of refugees and displaced migrants as needed.

Generally, the UNHCR has emphasised the health and wellbeing of refugees and has advocated that all refugees be entitled to access healthcare services of the same nature provided to the host country’s citizens - irrespective of race, sex or nationality. This includes both physical and mental health services (Ekmeleddin, 2017). International organisations tend to offer financial support to healthcare facilities, as well as the human labour required to facilitate the delivery of the services rendered in these facilities. Women, children and the elderly, who are considered to be most vulnerable to health conditions, are prioritised with such services.

To establish the aforementioned rights-based framework, case-specific programming is required. It remains the case that the health of refugees is determined largely by their situation - while effective programming varies according to both the type of refugees the host country is receiving - as well as the capacity of the host countries to provide necessary services.
Communicable & Non-Communicable Diseases

Health conditions related to displacement vary according to refugee populations’ experience within both their countries of origin and host countries. Children are the most vulnerable among an already vulnerable population. According to a study conducted on displaced people from different developing countries including Somalia, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, children were at the highest risk of infection and to being carriers themselves of infectious and communicable diseases (Sloth-Nielsen 2016). In most cases, these children were most vulnerable to diseases such as malaria and measles. Additionally, poor nutrition resulted in conditions such as anaemia. Other health conditions also developed due to poor hygiene. The issue remains that the inadequacy or inefficient health surveillance in most host countries fosters these poor health conditions for the refugees.

Pre-existing communicable diseases in some host countries leave refugees less immune to infection. An example of this is the outbreak of cholera in some of the Sub-Saharan Africa countries. Cholera is a highly contagious disease that is transmitted through direct contact with contaminated food and water. The disease has recurrently occurred in South Sudan and its neighbouring areas. Between 2013 and 2014, three serious cases of cholera were detected in South Sudan (Parker et al., 2017). The fatality rate of this disease is high due to poorly equipped healthcare facilities, as well as its contagious nature. Refugees seeking asylum in a state like South Sudan for instance, are presented with a situation in which primary health care systems are already under pressure from the host country’s existing conditions.

Other examples of infectious diseases that have thrived in refugee populations include Giardiasis, which affects the intestines and is transmitted through contact with contaminated water and food. It is common among the refugees fleeing Afghanistan (Richter et al., 2019). Leishmaniosis is another parasitic disease associated with refugees fleeing Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. The disease is vector-borne and is often transmitted by sand-flies (Mockenhaupt et al., 2016). In most cases, refugees are given anti-parasite medications to counter the spread. Another way to prevent the spread is through prevention - or so it was the protocol of the WHO with malaria, which the organisation classified being endemic among refugees globally (Wahid et al., 2016). However, the issue remains that refugees are more prone to malaria due to insufficient prevention methods and surveillance systems in the host countries leading to adverse effects on the children and pregnant women (Molnarova, Wolf & Tenna, 2016).

Non-communicable diseases are also prevalent in refugee populations. The right to food and adequate nutrition, for instance, is one aspect that can influence these conditions. Conditions such as diabetes and anaemia have been associated with the lack of proper nutrition among refugees. Syrian refugees in Zaatar Camp in Jordan, for instance, recorded 48.4% of the children under the age of five to be anaemic (Kay et al., 2019). According to Elliott et al., (2018), 6.1% of Syrian refugees are prone to blood sugar imbalances while the figure among Iraqi refugees stands at 3% (Elliott et al., 2018). The compound effect of lifestyle changes as well as inadequate nutritious food contributes to these conditions (Kay et al. 2019). The lack of screenings, as well as the lack of programming to address these issues, only increases the burden in the long-term for the host-countries, and exacerbates the health and well-being of these populations.

Refugees fleeing war or natural disasters are affected by the disrupted systems of their countries, or directly impacted by the turmoil. This turmoil interrupts the treatment process of patients. Cancer patients are an example of those who become vulnerable to health deterioration by alterations to the quality of life or accessibility to health services (Saghir et. al, 2018). Displaced patients often face health-systems that lack regular screenings or treatment programme, especially for diseases that require long-term or expensive medical care (Saghir et. al, 2018).

The issue, however, does not only correlate with poor capacity for health surveillance and services, but also to the inadequacy of screening and a holistic examination of the inevitable drastic shift in lifestyle. For instance, refugees hosted in developed countries were found to develop chronic infections, as well as fatal conditions like cancer (Shawyer et al., 2017).
**Women’s Health**

As alluded to earlier, communicable diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, giardiasis, leishmanioses, and other parasitic infections are common among refugees (Doocy et al. 2016). In addition to these types of communicable diseases, women are especially highly prone to sexually transmitted diseases (Elliott et al., 2018). Sexual violence in war is one factor that leaves women victims of physical and mental health. Along with the mental and emotional impact on women, sexually-affiliated conditions remain a challenge in the camps - whether due to programming negligence or cultural barriers.

Additionally, refugee women have trouble accessing female hygiene products. Maintaining proper health entails access to clean water and hygienic supplies such as sanitary towels. The challenge of such maintenance results in various health complications among girls and women in the refugee camps - some of which are directly affiliated with their menstrual cycles (Schmitt et al., 2017). Additionally, their health weaknesses and lack of social support subject them to a threat of further harassment or falling victims to traffickers as has been reported from France’s Dunkirk’s refugee camp (Townsend 2017).

**Mental Health & Psychosocial Support**

Refugees are vulnerable to mental illness. Ignoring this can lead to the early stages of psychiatric conditions, post-traumatic stress disorder and/or depression (Ellis et al., 2019). Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and anxiety have adversely affected the health and wellness of the majority of refugees (Silove et al., 2017). The experience of displacement inevitably entails the loss of many rights and freedoms as well as the difficulties of adjusting to a new environment.

Refugees are more vulnerable to mental and emotional health concerns. A survey conducted among the Syrian, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan refugees in 2015 shows that 54% of refugees faced challenges resulting from mental illness (Saleh et al., 2018). Moreover, traumatic experiences among children are said to last for longer periods due to a lack of psychological assessments to monitor their mental state during developmental stages (De Jong et al., 2017).
The Barrier & the Burden

Even though the importance of a rights-based health framework has become a part of the conversation related to refugee healthcare as per the Ottawa Charter, significant barriers to healthcare for refugees remain. These barriers also represent an economic and political burden for the host countries. The economic burden pertains to the provisions and programming of healthcare, while political responsibility pertains to ensuring security, accessibility, and the implementation of international organisations’ programmes. The WHO designed a “strategy and action plan” to adhere to the health requirements affiliated with displacement. These entail “...the need to ensure the availability, accessibility, acceptability, affordability and quality of essential services in transit and host environments, including health and social services, together with basic services such as water and sanitation” (WHO). The barriers and the burdens vary across host-countries, and this is why health programming ought to be part and parcel of national action plans.

For countries to integrate these programmes in their national agendas, a case-specific protocol has to be developed. In other words, the national strategies ought to work with stakeholders to deliver the relevant services that are based on the actual needs of the populations and not merely what is required by international aid organisations or donors. The implementation of these case-specific strategies is a matter of political and economic coordination. For example, refugees need special psychosocial support beyond treating physical injuries.

Cost is one of the most important considerations for effective policy implementation. In Kenya, for example, $111.1 million is spent on basic healthcare services for refugees (Macharia, G., & Ruigu, 2017). Additionally, the World Food Programme (WFP) spends nearly $126 million towards establishing food security among the refugee population (Macharia, G., & Ruigu, 2017). On top of that, in order to maintain administrative operations in the country, $34.6 million is required (Macharia, G., & Ruigu, 2017). As evidenced, political will on behalf of the host country is also essential. Political will entails the country’s willingness to take responsibility, especially financially, for the protection of refugees on its land, while granting them legal status.

Policy Conclusions

The conversation on a rights-based health system should continue. As we continue to witness unprecedented levels of displacement, host countries need to work collectively on treatment and preventive strategies. Issues such as poor governance and surveillance, beyond material aid, can influence the situation. It makes it difficult to monitor the risk, manage the infections, and provide emergency services to ensure the proper access to healthcare services for refugee populations, let alone the shortage of on-site medical personnel that may be associated with the insecurity of a region (Gee et al., 2018). For all these reasons, there ought to be an investment in the health governance sector, especially in developing countries who continue to host large refugee populations.

Beyond governance and the capacity of the system, the health and well-being of migrants is also directly related to their political and economic status. The maintenance of rights-based health systems is conditioned upon host-countries’ national policies towards the legal status of refugees, over and above the question of accessibility. There are various conditions, often compounded, that affect the health of refugees (Shishehgar et al., 2017). However, and perhaps most importantly - they all present an economic burden with regards to their redress. The right to health for migrants is an important humanitarian plea; however, failing to establish a rights-based health system will only exacerbate the economic burden in the long run. This is because it will affect the productivity and agency of these populations over their own well-being and aspirations. Moreover, there are also socioeconomic, cultural, and political factors - known as the social determinants of health. For that reason, the well-being of refugees is not only the output of a rights-based health system alone, but a rights-based governance of all their rights, including the right to housing, education, and employment.
A helicopter belongs to WFP, ‘World Food Programme’ brings food at Rubkuai village of Unity State, northern South Sudan on February 17, 2017. Due to the malnutrition, lack of food, continuing clashes and poverty, South Sudanese people, especially babies live in hard conditions.

(Handout/UNICEF/Motola - Anadolu Agency)
The Role of ‘Resilience’ in International Refugee Response Plans

By Anna Murphy

A Buzzword for Humanitarianism

As we enter into a new decade, international actors are increasingly responding to the mass displacement of populations throughout the world with a heightened focus on the impacts of these movements on host communities. Resilience has become a popular term featuring in discussions and policy recommendations regarding refugees and the countries in which they settle. As part of the conversation on human rights for refugees, there is a growing need to analyse the ways in which the community impact of displaced persons is assessed. While it has always had a small presence within discussions of refugee policy, the concept of refugee resilience has proliferated since the beginning of the conflict in Syria. Making its way into academia, governmental and non-governmental policy, and mainstream media, refugee resilience has broadly been understood as the mechanisms through which both displaced persons and their new host communities respond and recover to crises. Yet, the importance of this concept today creates a pressing need to further unpack this overarching definition. Specifically, as we enter into the tenth year of conflict in Syria, there is a need to analyse the broader implications of the understandings of resilience for communities at risk, specifically in regards to the recovery and dignity of refugees.
Defining Resilience in Refugees

Resilience, as we understand it today, finds its origins in the concept of ecological resilience. Ecological resilience theory refers to the ability of an ecosystem to adapt and recover from external threat or damage (Levin, 2010). According to this definition, resilience is defined and subsequently measured on a community level. This ‘resilience’ identifies an external event or factors that happen to an existing environment, describing — in its closest comparison — the ability of a host community to adapt to an influx of displaced persons. However, the potentially negative connotations of this application of resilience theory to policy need to be acknowledged. Moreover, there is a significant body of work on resilience within psychology. Psychological resilience, unlike ecological resilience theory, focuses on the individual. As showcased in a variety of academic work, it defines the ability of an individual or group of people to recover from extreme damage or disturbance (Rutter, 1987). Psychological resilience has been widely and frequently applied within the context of refugee populations, as well as child psychology and studies of other at-risk communities (Wietse, 2013).

These two definitions of resilience do not represent a chronological transition of understanding, but rather, highlight the two simultaneous focuses of resilience theory that can be applied to refugee resilience today. Yet, while these coexisting - yet somewhat contrasting - definitions of resilience can freely exist within the realm of academia, their impacts on governmental and non-governmental approaches to current refugee resilience have real and serious consequences. In other words, in looking at refugee policy, there is a pressing question in regards to which, if any, understanding of resilience is applied in formulating refugee policy with regards to access to justice, education, health or economic opportunity.
References to refugee resilience can be found in every major non-governmental organisation (NGOs) focused on displaced populations. Yet, resilience is not just a buzzword; it has become the backbone for refugee response plans for some of the most influential humanitarian organisations in the world. For example, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has published its 3RP, or the “Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan” every year since 2015 (UNHCR, 2015). This report is specifically dedicated to updating its intended audience on the status of Syrian refugees through a resilience framework. The UNHCR is not the only body to prioritise resilience; the International Rescue Committee (IRC) also frequently releases reports identifying resilience as the key next step in their future efforts to aid refugees from Syria and around the world (IRC, 2018). Furthermore, the International Office of Migration’s (IOM) usage of resilience in its policy has spiked since 2015 and has been upheld as a new and primary framework for refugee response plans (IOM, 2017).

While refugee resilience is clearly at the forefront of these organisations’ work, there is a pressing need to move beyond the theory and buzzwords of resilience in order to unpack the quantifiable measurements of resilience cited by these NGOs. Based on the UNHCR and IRC’s abundant use of resilience in their publications, as well as their global prominence as humanitarian organisations, these bodies represent valuable case studies. In particular, we can see how reports from the UNHCR and IRC define resilience in regards to refugees and/or host communities, and what these definitions mean for their overall refugee policies. Additionally, the allocation of resources to certain mechanisms of resilience will also shed light on how these organisations shape refugee policy affecting refugee outcomes.

Case Studies in Humanitarianism:
The UNHCR

The UNHCR defines resilience as “the ability of individuals, households, communities and institutions to anticipate, withstand, recover and transform from shocks and crises, natural or man-made” (UNHCR, 2015). This definition can be found in the introduction of every 3RP report that has been published since 2015. The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plans outline the UNHCR’s official strategies to foster ‘resilience’ in the face of the ongoing Syrian conflict. Resilience is also used throughout the report to describe a variety of the UNHCR’s policy priorities, including promoting a “resilience framework” and providing funding for “resilience activities” (UNHCR, 2018). Moreover, resilience is frequently cited as a counterpart to humanitarian responses; the 3RP reports identify “humanitarian aid” or response and “resilience” as a seemingly two-part focus of their agenda, with resilience referring to the policy recommendations intended to foster longer-term and non-immediate responses to refugee populations (UNHCR, 2018). This application of resilience draws many logical parallels to understandings of the two-part relationship between humanitarian aid and development, which is also frequently cited in UN and UN-affiliated humanitarian reports.

However, the aspect of these reports that sheds the most light on how resilience is envisioned by the UNHCR lies in the contrast between how it is used in the reports as a term to describe both refugees and host communities, and how it is ultimately confined to the parameters of host communities in the recommended allocation of financial resources. For example, the introduction of the 2019-2020 3RP report states a series of strategic goals for the UNHCR’s refugee policies, including “building the resilience of refugees and host communities” (UNHCR, 2019). According to this statement, resilience appears to be a concept that applies to both refugees and host communities equally.

Nevertheless, the estimated financial requirements published in each 3RP report since 2015 have been consistently organised under two main and distinct categories of funding: the “refugee component” and the “resilience component” (UNHCR, 2015). In the 2020-2021 report, the UNHCR reported an estimated cost of $3.2 billion for the refugee component of the 3RP and an estimated cost of $2.2 billion for its resilience component (UNHCR, 2020). The costs are sorted into these two categories based on two noticeable features: whether the funds go to the displaced or host communities and whether the funds are intended for immediate aid or longer-term assistance. The resilience component of the UNHCR’s 3RP, therefore, appears to be seen as the long-term, host community-oriented part of the organisation’s overall refugee framework.

Specific usage of the term resilience to outline a major division of the NGO’s funding highlights how resilience is increasingly seen not just as a theoretical concept or buzzword, but rather, as something that can be achieved through financial resources. Resilience is discussed in the 3RP — and subsequently promoted as a UNHCR policy—as an ability that can be applied through financial aid to targeted areas of focus in regards to both the people who have been displaced and the communities that now host them. Supporting resilience, therefore, has become as much of a financial contribution as a definition of adaptation or development. Moreover, while continuously used in adjectival
form throughout the report in regards to both supporting the resilience of refugees and host communities, the featured financial component of the report ultimately highlights the UNHCR’s approach to resilience within their 3RP as a long-term development agenda intended to prioritise the ability of host communities to adjust to influxes of displaced persons.

This discussion of resilience within the UNHCR policy framework can reasonably be understood as a potentially insensitive application of resilience theory to discussions of refugee recovery. The UNHCR appears to have indicated an awareness of this concern in their 2020-2021 3RP. In their most recent report, the UNHCR highlighted conflict sensitivity and the “importance of efforts to support social cohesion and stability” as key features of their resilience approach for the first time (UNHCR, 2020). By including these focuses within the resilience component of their report, the UNHCR is perhaps moving the host-community component of funding slightly closer to the direct experience of refugees, and making the financial distinction between categories a little blurrier for the future. Resilience, therefore, is defined and showcased through the UNHCR as a broad and impactful term to describe mechanisms of adjustment in the face of global conflict and displacement. Ultimately, however, the tangible consequences of resilience’s prominence in 21st-century humanitarian policy seems to focus mainly on the ability of the host communities to adapt to these changes.
Case Studies in Humanitarianism: The IRC

The International Rescue Committee represents another NGO dedicated to refugee relief that has increasingly featured resilience in its published reports. For example, beginning in 2016, the IRC aligned with the Rockefeller Foundation to support an ongoing list of ‘resilient cities’ known as the 100RC. The IRC has aided the Rockefeller Foundation in helping “member cities grappling with challenges related to displaced populations” (100RC, 2016). According to the IRC and its CEO David Miliband, the IRC’s support of programmes such as the 100RC reflects the NGO’s efforts to aid resilience among both refugees and refugee host communities worldwide. Like the UNHCR and 3RP, the 100RC reflects the use of resilience as a prominent descriptor in global displacement language in reference to both refugees and host cities.

The IRC has also showcased their independent approach to resilience through several reports on refugee populations that have been published in recent years. In a 2018 report entitled “From Response to Resilience”, the IRC outlined an extensive resilience plan aimed at supporting the cities of Amman and Kampala in their response to mass influxes of displaced persons (IRC, 2018). “From Response to Resilience” highlights two familiar components of refugee resilience policy. First, as showcased from the title of the report itself, the IRC repeatedly frames its application of resilience within a humanitarian timeline of crisis recovery. It characterises resilience as a set of actions that follows immediate aid applied to refugee crises. The temporality of resilience — now showcased in both the UNHCR and IRC reports — highlights the NGO’s understanding of resilience as a longer-term phenomenon. This revelation should not be understated, as it offers a crucial and somewhat unique component of resilience theory within current humanitarian policy.

Policy Recommendations

This discussion of resilience highlights the origins of the term’s usage, its presence in leading humanitarian organisations’ involvement in the global refugee crisis, and the potential limitations of its mass application when it comes to refugee outcomes. Most importantly, however, it aims to show that while resilience is so frequently included in the policy to describe the recovery of refugee communities, the quantifiable consequences of this buzzword’s inclusion are often focused on the policies and resources that describe host communities. As organisations like the UNHCR and IRC use resilience to promote their policies as long-term support efforts for refugee communities, the distinctions between refugee resilience and host community resilience need to be made clearer. Moreover, while refugee resilience continues to show up across humanitarian work as a supposed priority, there remain many questions about what refugee resilience in the 21st century NGO actually means. Thus, as we witness the potential consequences of buzzwords in humanitarianism, we must strive to ask what, if any, are better ways to describe and support the needs of refugee populations in 2020 and beyond.
A Syrian refugee female teacher instructs refugee students, fled from civil war in Syria, at a class located in a refugee facility in Malatya, Turkey on March 08, 2016. Approximately 80 refugee female teacher serve refugee children. (Volkan Kaşik - Anadolu Agency)
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