Carter`s adoption of the proposed liaison plan would have signaled U.S. support for Sadat`s unprecedented peace initiative. But Carter said no. Carter, however, could not thwart the Israeli-Egyptian peace push. Within days, Israeli journalists were allowed to cross a symbolic barrier, and from there, the peace process quickly gained momentum. An Israeli-Egyptian working summit was scheduled for December 25 in Ismailiya, near the Suez Canal. [12] President Sadat`s visit to Jerusalem was a psychological turning point that, with the agreement that followed, set a lasting precedent and expectations for the restoration of Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli peace. Today, despite what seems to be gradually improving relations between some Arab states and Israel, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a ceiling to complete and formalized Arab-Israeli peace. The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) is the institution created by the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty to monitor the implementation of the security provisions of the agreement and prevent violations. It was designed by the Israelis and Egyptians for their particular security situation and its scope is limited to the Sinai Peninsula. The success of the MFO structure is based on several mutually reinforcing pillars, both structurally and in terms of content. Their mandate is specific and unambiguous.
Both sides feel stubborn and invest in the longevity and stability of the peace they are negotiating. The continued leadership and support of the United States has been crucial. All this is supported by an effective command structure and optimized decision-making and communication channels. The end result is a mechanism that is respected by both parties as reliable and professional, and in which both see the value of maintenance. Peace between Egypt and Israel has lasted since the treaty entered into force, and Egypt has become an important strategic partner of Israel. Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, a former Israeli defense minister known for his close ties to Egyptian officials, said: “Egypt is not only our closest friend in the region, the cooperation between us goes beyond strategy. [14] The move stems from the eagerness to seek help from NATO countries to improve Egypt`s struggling economy, the belief that Egypt should begin to focus more on its own interests than on the interests of the Arab world, and the hope that an agreement with Israel would catalyze similar agreements between Israel and its other Arab neighbors and help resolve the Palestinian problem. Prime Minister Begin`s response to Sadat`s initiative, but not what Sadat or Carter had hoped for, showed a willingness to engage the Egyptian leader. Like Sadat, Begin saw many reasons why bilateral talks should be in his country`s best interest. This would give Israel the opportunity to negotiate only with Egypt, rather than with a larger Arab delegation that might try to use its size to make unwelcome or unacceptable demands.
Israel believed that Egypt could help protect Israel from other Arabs and communists in the East. Moreover, the start of direct negotiations between heads of state and government – diplomacy at the top – would set Egypt apart from its Arab neighbors. Carter`s people apparently had no idea about the secret talks in Morocco between Dayan and Sadat`s representative, Hassan Tuhami, that paved the way for Sadat`s initiative. In fact, Egypt and Israel joined forces in one way or another to dissuade Carter from following his trail from Geneva. The fundamental message of Sadat`s speech in the Knesset was the demand for the implementation of Resolutions 242 and 338. Sadat`s visit was the first step towards negotiations such as the Cairo Preparatory Conference in December 1977. [Citation needed] Camp David`s ultimate legacy will depend on how its vision of a broader regional peace is translated into reality. This was another interim agreement or another stage, but the resulting negotiations slowed down for several reasons. This included the inability to involve Jordanians in the discussions; the controversy over regulations; the inconclusive nature of subsequent self-government talks; the internal opposition maintained by Begin and Sadat and, in sadat`s case, the exclusion and anger of the Arab world; the emergence of a cold peace between Egypt and Israel; and changes in foreign policy priorities, including the discontinuity of staff engaged in maintaining the negotiation process[.] [18] The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel was signed 16 months after Egyptian President Anwar Sadat`s visit to Israel in 1977 after intense negotiations. .